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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Democracy rests upon a rich and complex ambiguity. Because of the 
numerous and often discordant ways in which this word and idea have been 
interpreted, no such prototype exists, only variations of all kinds. Ralph 
Dahrendorf was right when, in addressing the people of Eastern Europe, he 
advocated the single, Popperian principle of the open society. “Within the 
constitution of liberty,” wrote Dahrendorf, “a hundred paths lead forward and 
all are likely to mix elements of economic, political and social reforms in ways 
which offend the jurist. The key to progress is therefore not a complete alter­
native conception, a detailed master plan of freedom. Such plans are contra­
dictions in terms and more likely to lead back to the closed society” 
(Dahrendorf, 1990, p. 150). So, if we want to try to answer the central ques­
tion of this meeting we have to introduce many qualifications into the debate. 
In other words, we must avoid falling into the trap of naïveté to which the true 
believers and zealots of democracy are prone. Their enthusiasm is somewhat 
comparable to the doctrinaire mind-sets of the former socialist countries. 
Looking at the experience of the recent démocratisation process in these 
countries and the views expressed by the media, politicians and sometimes aca­
demics, I get the feeling that many Westerners were paraphrasing the famous 
Leninist definition of communism: socialism + electricity. After the fall of the 
Berlin wall, many observers also expressed a reductionist view, whereby 
democracy was simply considered to be: the market + elections.
Fortunately, democracy is much more than this. Yet there is no single def­
inition of democracy. As indicated by the title of this conference, democracy is 
not a state of nature, it is a product of culture, un effet de l'art. Because of this 
cultural element, there is no such thing as a democratic model. There are 
democratic principles, whose implementation may vary from one polity to 
another: most Europeans would be reluctant to have elected judges while 
Americans would resist the idea of having only professional, tenured magis­
trates, for example.
But the paradoxes of Western democracy do not lie merely in its variety 
and diversity. Because of its sometimes very slow, sometimes very brutal, 
historical development, democratic systems necessarily incorporate elements 
and features of past non-democratic regimes. The Rechtsstaat and the Welfare 




























































































whatsoever in the mind of the rulers or their proponents. Corporatist tradi­
tions and institutions, as well as neo-corporatist practices, continue to flourish 
in most of continental Europe. Feudal or authoritarian rules and customs are 
still alive.
In other words, any democracy is a mix of pure democratic elements and 
liberal features. The democratic components or techniques are similar across 
countries and where there are variations, these differences tend to be limited: 
elections, referendums, electoral systems differ from country to country, but 
usually follow similar patterns. On the other hand, the liberal dimension 
introduces time and space variations which contribute to the specificity of each 
democratic system. All democratic systems are, in a way, democracies in the 
making. There is a certain amount of ignorance, even arrogance, in the old 
democracies’ demands that the new-comers to the democratic club fulfill all 
the criteria of a largely mythical model. Indeed, even the so-called “old 
democracies” were able to achieve a satisfactory degree of démocratisation 
only after many years, even centuries, of struggles, fights and hesitation. 
Rather than being an easy, fast track, the road to democracy has been painful, 
chaotic and long.
The story can be seen as the basic tension between these two complementary 
but conflicting elements, the democratic and the liberal, which together have 
constituted the pluralist political systems in the West (Leca, 1996). The con­
flicts concern the respective domain of each part and drawing the line between 
the two: how much is to be conceded to the democratic claim, how much 
reserved to the liberal creed? The nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth have revealed how representative government became more and 
more permeated by the democratic and less and less influenced by the liberal 
tradition. In Europe as well as in the United States, the political struggle has 
been over the conquest of universal suffrage (extension to all the adult male 
population, then to women, youth, and racial-ethnic minority groups), elec­
toral systems’ ensuring of fair representation and the elimination of political 
corruption.
The period from the Second World-War to the present has been charac­
terised by a reverse trend. In continental Europe, the failure of democratic 
systems unable to face the challenges of the times or resist the manipulation of 
popular votes has convinced elites and constitution-makers to limit the excesses 
of the democratic element and to reinforce the liberal dimension. Popular 
input has been counterbalanced by various checks and balances, by procedures 




























































































from 1945 to 1990 was characterised by the rise and triumph of constitutional­
ism. It flourished first in Germany and Italy, then contaminated France, ex­
panded into the former right-wing dictatorships of Southern Europe and 
reached its apex in the collapse of the socialist regimes and the intense activity 
of constitution-building in Eastern Europe. With a mix of success and failure, 
the democratic proselytisers exported the triumphant model to the rest of the 
word: South America, Asia, Africa. In a rather presumptuous way, some 
announced the end of history and claimed that there is in fact no alternative.
More recently, most of the democratic systems faced new challenges. Many 
labels have been placed upon this multifaceted phenomenon: globalisation, 
multi-culturalism, territorial autonomy, gender rights. It is difficult to evalu­
ate their relative impact upon the functioning and sometimes very survival of 
democratic systems, nevertheless, they clearly reverse the post-war trend 
characterised by a persistent and still on-going process of elite domination 
under the cover of constitutionalism. It might be that the limits of this ideolog­
ical and institutional preference for constitutionalism have been reached. Grass 
roots pressures in favour of a stronger democratic input have become more 
and more apparent in most Western political systems. This eruption of the 
people onto the political scene might be preparing the way for a new equilib­
rium between the democratic and liberal components. But re-balancing power, 
influence and institutions is always a risky operation. Too much constitutional­
ism jeopardises the democratic foundations of the regime by reducing the 
actual capacity of the people to influence and control political choices; too 
much direct input from the people can run the risk of majoritarian intolerance 
or dictatorial capture.
My argument is that constitutionalism has grown to its limits and that ruling 
elites are in crisis. They are facing a growing legitimacy problem resulting 
from the people’s frustration and dissatisfaction with those who govern. More 
and more individuals, groups and emerging new leaders are coming to claim 
that they should have more say in the running of public affairs. You can call it 
popular will, the voice of the people, or public choice, if you see these phe­
nomena in a positive light. On the other hand, if you don’t like the interfer­
ence of the masses in the elite club, it is easy to discredit it with the vague 
label: “populism”. In fact, we can consider populism in the same way in which 
Italo Calvino speaks of his Barone dimezzato. Like the baron split in two dur­
ing a fight, populism has two faces: one positive, which provides legitimacy to 
the democratic system, the Government o f the people, by the people, for the 
people; the other negative, which might lead to exclusion, nationalism, xeno­





























































































Let me start with the supremacy of constitutionalism. This is a long story 
which began a few centuries ago. To use a common word in the Cold War 
period, the liberal problem is a problem of containment. How can a political 
system be built-up which can protect individuals and groups from each other? 
How can dictatorship by an individual or the domination of a group, even if a 
majority, be avoided? Benjamin Barber vividly illustrates the liberal dilemma 
in reminding us that:
Liberal democratic imagery seems to have been fashioned in a menagerie. It teems with 
beasts and critters of every description: sovereign lions, princely lions and foxes, 
bleating sheep and poor reptiles, ruthless pigs and ruling whales, sly polecats, clever 
coyotes, ornery wolves (often in sheep’s clothing) and finally, in Alexander Hamilton’s 
formidable image, all mankind itself is but one great Beast (Barber, 1984, 20).
Today, the victory of the liberal creed is complete not only because of its 
merits, but also because of the failures of the alternatives. Within the liberal 
democracies and countries aspiring to the Western model, constitutionalism 
has become the key value and catch-word. Following the disastrous experience 
of the twenties and thirties and the collapse of most infant democracies at that 
time, the post-1945 period has been characterised by a growing consensus on 
the fundamental virtues of constitutionalism. New mechanisms, such as the 
establishment of Constitutional Courts or independent Central Banks, have 
constituted the landmarks of this new era. Inspired by the American Madiso­
nian realism adopted by most new constitutions of the post-war era and imi­
tated by later followers, whether old or new democracies, constitutionalism 
has been successfully exported to the rest of the world. Americans and Euro­
peans have competed in trying to sell their particular model, their set of insti­
tutions, their constitutional kit.
This constitutionalist bias has encountered some resistance here and there. 
The British still refuse to create a Supreme Court, even though their legisla­
tion is partly reviewed by the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts. It took 
nearly ten years for Italy to put its Constitutional Court in place. And France 
was the most reluctant of all, for a long time refusing the gouvernement des 
juges and to sacrifice its republican traditions to the liberal, democratic view, 
a position supported not only by the French political class, but also by most 




























































































This evolution of both values and institutions was accompanied and rein­
forced by the transformation of the political system: in the sixties and seventies 
there were still demands both for an extension of suffrage to new groups and 
lower levels of government (neighbourhoods, regions) and for a broader par­
ticipation and involvement of the people outside the purely political sphere 
(for instance, in the universities and factories). The post-’68 period was seen 
by many observers, including prestigious political scientists such as Crozier 
and Huntington, as endangering and undermining democracies by putting too 
much strain on the system (Crozier, Huntington and al., 1975). “Too much 
democracy kills democracy” was the message. Restraint of political participa­
tion was seen as a safeguard against an uncontrolled invasion of the masses into 
the world of the few. However, we might wonder whether or not these exu­
berant manifestations were not already a reaction against the capture of the 
democratic system by a narrow and self-perpetuating elite. At the very same 
time as some of our colleagues were expressing their fears about popular 
involvement, others were using new words and typologies to define particular 
European systems: Parteienstaat, Partitocrazia, Partitocratie. Without using the 
dramatic tones and at times reactionary motives of some of their famous pre­
decessors, scholars and observers were reasserting the conclusions of Pareto, 
Mosca, Michels, Schumpeter and Ostrogorsky. But many, far from being 
worried about such a situation, insisted that democracy was not what people 
were told it was. Giovanni Sartori is probably the front-runner in this enter­
prise of Weberian disenchantment, but Popper’s definition of democracy per­
haps best captures the mood of the time: “Democracy is the word for some­
thing which does not exist” (Popper, 1988). So far, so good: the people elects 
representatives selected by parties and its role is limited to approving or re­
jecting the policies set-out by the ruling elites.
In recent years, this trend has been pushed even further: not only does the 
people not have much say in the political process, other than at election time, 
but entire policy areas have also been removed from political control. In the 
name of the battle against excessive politicisation, more and more domains, 
especially in the economic sphere, have been placed under the responsibility of 
non-elected persons usually chosen for their experience and/or expertise. 
Agencies, authorities, courts, QUANGO’S, and various “semi-public” bodies, 
add a new dimension to Madisonian-style democracy. These new institutions 
have flourished everywhere nationally and have also expanded on the regional 
and international levels. New forms of legitimacy have emerged based on ex­
pertise, independence and apolitical/non-partisan involvement. It might also be 
interpreted as the confrontation between two different ways of conceiving of 




























































































instance, popular control; the other believes that economics and markets are 
too important to be placed in the hands of politicians. As argued by the Court 
of Karlsruhe, for instance, monetary policy can be better ensured by an inde­
pendent central bank than by “governments that are dependent on the short 
term of political forces”.
Until recently, this evolution has received wide support amongst political, 
economic and social elites. Rather than counteract the progressive capture of 
the system by political parties through the institution of popular mechanisms 
of checks and controls, these new forms of division of power were usually 
preferred. There is probably only one exception to this general trend: the use 
of referenda by some countries with regards to the process of European inte­
gration. Academics in general have tended to favour this transformation, 
sometimes even contributing to the creation of new types of sacred cows. 
Having been one of the very few French academics to have advocated the 
transformation of the Conseil Constitutionnel into a true Constitutional Court, 
I am well-placed today to critically re-evaluate the benefits, but also the draw­
backs, of such a general evolution.
It is probably my colleague and friend, Giandomenico Majone, who has ex­
pressed with the most enthusiasm and vigour the preference for a new type of 
decision-making based on expertise, independence and accountability (Majone, 
1996). His reasoning is based on the distinction drawn in the nineteenth centry 
by the Swedish economist, Wicksell, between efficiency and redistribution and 
the need to tackle these two problems through different channels of decision­
making. Efficient policies attempt to improve the welfare of all, or nearly all, 
while re-distributive policies improve the conditions of one group at the ex­
pense of others. Re-distributive policies, he argues, can only be achieved by 
majoritarian decisions, since unanimity is impossible. Efficient policies, where 
everyone can gain, should in principle be adopted by unanimity. Given the 
difficulty of achieving unanimity, the second-best solution can be the use of a 
decision taken by qualified majority or delegated to independent experts or 
non-majoritarian institutions. Majone does not deny that these modes of deci­
sion-making raise new legitimacy problems, but does underline the fact that 
these new criteria of legitimacy and accountability “are better adapted to the 
realities of an increasingly interdependent world than those derived from the 
traditional, but largely mythical model of pure majoritarian democracy”. 
However, this evolution is far from being unanimously accepted either at na­
tional or regional/international levels. Referring to a ruling against the Euro­




























































































Commissioner, Franz Fischler, questioned the “lack of democratic control” 
over this international board. This latest example is only one among many.
This academic debate in fact runs parallel to a more heated and political dis­
cussion in many countries. More and more people are dissatisfied with the way 
politics works and democracy functions. In many countries of continental 
Europe, there is a deep malaise and I would like to turn now to the examina­
tion of its symptoms and causes.
What’s wrong with present democratic arrangements?
Charles Meier, in a recent contribution entitled: Democracy and its discon­
tents (Meier, 1994), stressed that the present crisis of democracies is very dif­
ferent from the crisis of the seventies, which was about economic adjustment 
and the distribution of benefits. Today’s crisis is more complex and possibly 
more dangerous as it tends to challenge not so much the outcome of democ­
racy, but its very foundations. Let me first consider the symptoms of this cri­
sis and then try to offer some kind of interpretation.
I suggest we focus on three elements of this PolitikverdrossenheiV. electoral 
volatility, partisan decartelization, and distrust of politicians.
First, the volatility of the electorate has become a general problem. It is an 
already vivid phenomenon in Eastern Europe, but can be explained both by the 
disillusions of the post-’89 period and by the still unstable party system. In 
Western Europe, however, it is now clear that the old cleavages, such as class 
and religion, are less and less able to structure and explain electoral behaviour. 
The manifestations of this volatility are many: large and unstable variations in 
electoral participation, shifts in political preferences from one election to the 
other and voting against the parties of government and in favour of protest 
movements or radical parties. Even in countries such as Germany, Austria, or 
Italy, which have enjoyed high levels of voter turn-out and stable voting for 
the parties in government over the last fifty years, changes have been substan­
tial and even dramatic, in the Italian case. The old allegiances have been weak­
ened and new parties try to capture a floating electorate which is indifferent to 
political debates, skeptical about government and party programmes and 
critical of outcomes. If, as Fritz Scharpf argues, democracy can be tested both 




























































































democratic input has become weaker and weaker and the democratic output 
less and less convincing in the eyes of the citizens (Scharpf, 1997).
Second, the instability of electoral behaviour has deeply transformed the 
situation of the political parties. During the seventies, eighties and early 
nineties, political parties in Western Europe underwent a progressive trans­
formation, which Katz and Mair have analysed as a process of “cartelization”. 
According to them, “we see the emergence of a new type of party, the cartel 
party, characterised by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a 
pattern of inter-party collusion. In this sense, it is perhaps more accurate to 
speak of the emergence of cartel parties, since this development depends on 
collusion and co-operation between ostensible competitors, and on agreements 
which, of necessity, require the consent and co-operation of all, or almost all, 
participants”(Katz and Mair, 1996, p. 17).
This analysis is rather convincing and everyone can agree that “politics 
becomes a job rather than a vocation”(ib., p. 23). However, the picture they 
offer seems more in-line with the situation of the eighties than with that of the 
nineties. The present situation could be more accurately described as a crisis of 
the cartel and as an on-going process of decartelization. These processes are 
slowed-down or blocked by the resistance of the cartel parties or by particular 
institutional devices, such as the electoral systems. But it is clear that the 
unchallenged supremacy of those parties entrenched in the state is no longer 
accepted by a large segment of the population. By its very existence, the party 
cartel sets the conditions under which it can be challenged by those who feel 
excluded. Having reached its apex in the eighties, the cartel system today con­
tributes to the de-legitimization of the democratic system itself, as more and 
more people tend to identify democracy with the way the members of the car­
tel run it. Katz and Mair sum-up this situation when they write that: 
“Democracy becomes a means of achieving social stability rather than social 
change and elections become ‘dignified’ parts of the Constitution” (ib„ p. 22). 
But this opinion is a mild assessment of a phenomenon which might take-on 
more dramatic tones.
A third dimension of the problem has to do with the deterioration of the 
relationship between rulers and the ruled. In many countries, in the U.S. as 
well as in Europe, we observe the growth of dissatisfaction with politics, par­
ties and politicians. It is revealing that expressions such as political class, 
oligarchy, establishment, nomenklatura have become part of everyday public 
discourse in talking about political elites. There are variations from country to 




























































































“they” versus “us”, is emerging through opinion polls, by-elections, referenda 
and, last but not least, the formation and advance of protest parties of all 
kinds. If we again use Scharpf’s distinction between input-oriented and output- 
oriented legitimizing beliefs, it would seem that both elements are in crisis: 
there is a lack of confidence in, a feeling of distrust of politicians and parties 
which is further accentuated by the incapacity of ruling elites to deliver to the 
people the policies to which they committed themselves in their electoral pro­
grammes.
One explanation often proposed in recent years has to do with the corrup­
tion scandals which have undermined many political systems over the last 
decade. Most of the European democracies have been confronted with illegal 
party financing, bribery and, in some cases, personal enrichment on the part 
of leading politicians. The confusion of markets and state, of public and pri­
vate interest, of civil service and self-interest, contributes to the de-legitimiza- 
tion of political parties. Politicians’ behaviour has further exacerbated this 
trend, in their denying the reality of significance of corruption and/or in their 
accusing the press and the judiciary of plotting against the representatives of 
the people. Another step in the downgrading of their public image has oc­
curred in that the parties under inquiry have also made sure to involve their 
opponents in similar scandals. Unfortunately, demonstrating that all are sin­
ners makes a meagre argument for the system. It simply comforts public 
opinion in its belief that all, or nearly all, politicians are rotten. Such scandals 
have had devastating effects in Spain, Greece, Italy and France. But other 
countries of Northern Europe, including Great Britain, have also fallen prey 
to this general lack of confidence in politicians and parties. Contrary to the 
situation in the thirties, democracy here, in most cases, has not been at stake. 
But the basic foundation of representative democracy, trust, has clearly been 
jeopardised.
However, we can wonder whether or not corruption has not simply been the 
acceleration of an already existing problem, that is, the more general weaken­
ing of political accountability. According to democratic theory, citizens have 
the right and the possibility to judge their government retrospectively through 
the electoral process, to sanction or reward it. However, we know by experi­
ence that these mechanisms are rather imperfect in their functioning. Wrong 
choices can be supported by the electorate and good leaders sanctioned for 
having made right ones: manipulation of public opinion through the media or 
clientelism can provide part of the explanation here. But most of the time, 
accountability is affected by problems such as the translation of individual 




























































































knows, the political cycle and the economic cycle do not always follow the 
same path. Accountability is, of course, imperfect, but the real problem today 
is the widespread perception by the public that politicians are not account­
able. As pointed-out by our colleague José-Maria Maravall: “Most of the time, 
democratic accountability and political success, both in elections and in office, 
are not easily compatible” (Maravall, 1997).
Paradoxically, many political leaders have attempted to escape their 
responsibility and to avoid control by the media or judiciary by pretending to 
be accountable only to the people. Such leaders know only too well that demo­
cratic control is often imperfect, tardy, or easily dismissed by demagogic or 
clientelistic policies. Such manipulation of democratic instruments by politi­
cians has reached its limits in recent years, when economic growth or gener­
ous distributive policies have provided easy instruments for buying voters’ 
consent. The changes in citizens’ behaviour have been rather dramatic: accus­
ing politicians of being blind and deaf, citizens have vindicated themselves by 
voting against the parties and incumbents in power, rather than in favour of an 
ideology or programme.
Another explanation for the disillusionment and resentment of the people 
lies in the transformation of the policy process. During the post-war period, 
characterised by democratic reconstruction and rapid growth of the economy, 
there was a nearly perfect overlap between the identity space, the economic 
space and the political space. And where there was tension, for instance, from 
an ethnic, cultural or linguistic point of view, governments could mobilise 
economic and/or political resources in order to redress the situation. Today, 
these various spaces do not coincide and make credible or successful interven­
tion by public authorities more difficult or even impossible.
First of all, there has been a general shift in public expectations. Fewer and 
fewer people believe in the capacity of the State to shape the society and pro­
mote the economy. The primacy of markets has been substituted for the im­
perium of the state in the mind of elites as well as of the people at-large.
Second, governments and parties have contributed to making the people 
aware of the new limits to public action in an era of globalisation and 
régionalisation. Without a doubt, many policies cannot be dealt with properly 
at the level of the polity, of the nation-state. It might be true that European 
integration, in the words of Alan Milward, has rescued the nation-state 
(Milward, 1992). But this rescue is not without problems, tensions and a loss 




























































































cation, as Dahl points-out. The solution to this disharmony might be, as sug­
gested by David Held, the constitution of a cosmopolitan order (Held and 
Archibugi, 1995). But for the time-being, there are more fears and frustra­
tions than hopes and optimism in this transitional period. The cynicism of 
some elites might even exacerbate these feelings when new trends are inten­
tionally exaggerated in order to put more pressure on groups and individuals 
reluctant to change: globalisation is often used as a quid pro quo to the 
Thatcherite formula: “there is no alternative”. By pretending that some harsh 
policies are the only possible options, politicians have contributed not only to 
de-legitimising the European construction, which is attacked for its democratic 
deficit, but also to weakening the public’s confidence in the government’s 
capacity to act purposefully and efficiently. We may have gone too far in 
blindly accepting the inferiority of politics and the unquestionable supremacy 
of markets.
This reduction of the policy space has been further exacerbated by the tight 
control of the policy agenda by elites. As political programmes become more 
of the same and are all too often variations on the same theme, electoral com­
petition can contribute to the setting of the political agenda only at the mar­
gins. What’s worse is that too many politicians have, once in power, betrayed 
their commitments to the people or have done a political U-turn unacceptable 
to the electorate. Whether correct or not, there is a diffuse feeling amongst the 
population that real problems to not interest the politicians or that they are 
deaf and blind. This view might be slightly exaggerated since elected represen­
tatives have a vested interest in getting the support of their voters. However, 
the flows of the accountability process and the cartelisation of parties have 
indeed impeded or made more difficult the introduction of certain political 
and social problems onto the agenda. Important issues such as gender, envi­
ronment, and migration, for example, have been brought onto the stage by 
minority groups or social movements. Most of the time, political leaders and 
parties have been late-comers in these areas. Despite slogans such as la poli­
tique autrement (politics in a different way), most politicians continue to prac­
tice politics as usual. And even when ruling elites do actually take-up issues 
raised by outsiders, they tend to reframe them according to their own interests 
and ideologies, giving the impression that they don’t care about their electoral 
commitments.
All these factors have contributed over the past years to increasing the 
frustration and disillusionment of the people, opening new space for populist 





























































































There is no clear definition of populism, partly because of the variations in 
the phenomenon over time and space and partly because of the loose way in 
which it is used, particularly in the media or by political actors. Thirty years 
ago, when Gellner and Ionescu attempted, along with some colleagues, to bet­
ter understand what was populism, their conclusions remained cautious 
(Gellner and Ionescu, 1969). Some of the contributors, for instance, insisted 
that populism was not an ideology, but a syndrome. More recently, a French 
sociologist, Pierre-André Taguieff, wrote that if populism is “a real problem, 
it was also a conceptual mirage”(Taguieff, 1995). It is indeed true that pop­
ulism has become a kind of catch-word loaded with contempt and prejudice. 
Latin American regimes, some leaders in former socialist countries as well as 
Ross Perot in the United States have been described as populist, as have the 
French Communist Party, the Italian Lega, the Front National, Margaret 
Thatcher, and Jacques Chirac. A recent issue of Die Zeit on “Populismus” in 
September 1997, illustrates the very flexible use of the concept in Germany as 
well.
This eclecticism in its application blurs the concept and might make one 
think it useless. However, the paradox still remains: why do we so venerate the 
people while hating populism? The answer to this question lies in the challenge 
populism poses to representative democracy. Populism pretends to be demo­
cratic, as indicated by its use of the famous motto: Government of the people, 
by the people, for the people. But its democratic claim contradicts the spirit, 
structure and modus operandi of the democracies as we know them, that is, 
representative democracies in which constitutionalism counter-balances the 
popular input.
Let me now turn to what constitutes the core of populism, to consider the 
context in which it develops and finally to assess the dangers and potentials of 
these movements.
Because of the very conditions of its emergence, populism defines itself first 
as an anti-system attitude or movement. Its reference point is always democ­
racy, but not liberal democracy. Under these conditions, populism invariably 
finds itself in a rather negative position vis-à-vis the political system. It might 
be fighting an authoritarian regime, as in nineteenth century Russia, but most 
of the time populism grows within a democratic system considered to be cor­




























































































systems in the name of the people by declaring them undemocratic. The pop­
ulist world is manichean: it pits the people against the elites, the community 
against outsiders or foreigners, individuals against groups and the bureau­
cracy, those with “common sense” against the intellectuals or ideologues.
Anti-elitism constitutes a key feature of populism. Political elites are ac­
cused of betraying their mandate, of looking-out only for their own self-inter­
est rather than for the public good, of being both incompetent and inefficient. 
Even worse, they are often accused of corruption as well. Economic elites are 
seen as the instruments of big capital or foreign companies contributing to the 
collapse and death of the hard-working, efficient, competent, but fragile small 
companies, farmers and craftsmen. Bankers are especially despised as man­
agers of an artificial economy making money on the backs of dedicated work­
ers. The big cities, the stock markets and, most of the time, the capital city of 
the country symbolise this capture of power, money and influence by a limited 
few: Washington, Paris, Roma ladra, and Brussels (as the centre of Europe) 
have become symbolic scapegoats. The same distrust applies to intellectuals, 
considered either as being too far from the people or deprived of what is con­
sidered to be the major quality of the people: le bon sens (common sense).
This systematic and sometimes violent condemnation of elites implies giving 
the power back to the people and getting rid of so-called representatives. The 
slogan of the French Poujadistes in the late fifties: Sortez les sortants (“Oust 
the incumbents”) is a reminder of the American populist motto at the end of 
the nineteenth century: “A gun behind the door”. However, the populist atti­
tude is ambiguous: bureaucrats are fiercely criticised, but the state is not 
always seen as an enemy. It can even be a shield against the internationalisation 
of finance or the globalisation of the economy. Populists hate lobbies and in 
particular banks or big firms, but they themselves mobilise groups such as 
farmers or tradesmen. Populists do not oppose the capitalist economy, but they 
usually dislike a deregulated, open market.
They advocate the power of the people, although not so much as individuals, 
but rather as members of a community, usually a national community. The 
community itself, however, might be an object of contention: most of the time, 
it is the nation, identified with those people who share an identity, a culture, a 
language. Sometimes, on the contrary, this community in the making identifies 
itself against the nation-state viewed as imposed and artificial. This is, for 
instance, the case of so-called Padania, the fake creature of the Italian Lega. 
Individuals are important as long as they fuse themselves with the community 




























































































belonging to the same group or culture. This sublimation of individuals within 
the community explains why the concept of the people becomes an abstraction, 
its appeal resting mainly in the rejection of a perceived hierarchical order: the 
elites versus the people, “they” versus “us”. But this anti-hierarchical attitude 
is somewhat contradicted by a fascination with the charismatic leader who, 
supposedly, embodies the features, claims and values of the people.
This set of values or aspirations has crucial implications for the rules and 
institutions of liberal democracy, the most important of which has probably to 
do with the concept of representation. Populists have an uneasy relationship 
with representation. On the one hand, they deeply dislike the representative 
system and the elites who run it. On the other hand, they are aware of the dif­
ficulty of running a community through direct involvement of the people. To 
solve this dilemma, populists propose a different view of what representation 
should be: first, representatives should be ideally as close as possible, as simi­
lar as possible, to the people they represent, not only politically, but, more 
importantly, sociologically. Identity is the key point of reference. Delegation 
is substituted for trust.
Second, according to populists, mediation through parties should be banned, 
given their propensity to defend their own interests instead of the interest of 
the people. This is a claim which has had broad appeal, as seen in the prohibi­
tion of party platforms or labels in many local elections in the U.S. and in 
persistent attacks against the traditional parties by populist groups such as the 
Lega, the Front National, the Austrian Freedom party, the Vlaams Blok or the 
Norwegian Progress Party. This claim has even contaminated the rhetoric of 
party leaders preferring to rely on their charisma than on party structure: 
Chirac, Reagan and Thatcher illustrate this contamination of the political 
debate by populist ideas. This anti-party attitude does not impede populists 
from organising themselves into some kind of party, under the direction of a 
strong leader. But these organisations pretend to be movements, not parties, 
and constantly have to face the risky process of institutionalisation which any 
movement must consider at some stage in its development.
From this initial predicament stem various institutional features: a prefer­
ence for proportional representation as the least damaging system for recruit­
ment of representatives; limitation of the length of terms in order to make 
elected officials more accountable; generalisation of elected offices being pre­
ferred to tenured bureaucratic appointments; de-politicisation of the political 
debate in the prohibition of party affiliation; the institution of mechanisms of 




























































































of the executive by the electorate, be it at national or local level; and, more 
recently and in line with public choice theory, a preference for territorial 
fragmentation and sectoral specialisation.
The populist impact, however, has also affected many other aspects, both 
old and new, of liberal democracy. It has contributed to a re-opening of the 
debate on citizenship, in particular with regards to the integration of foreign­
ers or the right to vote for European citizens not living in their country of 
origin. It has sometimes even asserted the right of the people to make their 
own justice. It has given a new impulse to nationalistic and chauvinistic claims 
and contributed to the rise of xenophonbia and anti-minority attitudes. It 
helped challenge the principle of solidarity between rich and poor regions in 
the name of fiscal federalism or regional autonomy. The Lega wants to get rid 
of the Mezzogiorno and the Catalans and Basques don’t want to pay for Galicia 
and Andalusia. In the most extreme cases, for instance, in France with the 
Front National, very sophisticated use of language allows leaders to evoke the 
worst memories of anti-Semitism and xenophobia without being overtly racist, 
and hence, subject to penal law.
I cannot agree more with Charles Meier when he writes that sooner or later 
“territorial populism tends to single-out as deviant and subversive those groups 
on the ethnic territory that stand for complexity and alternative principles of 
solidarity” (Meier, 1994, p. 61).
In its most extreme form, populism calls for exclusion or territorial divi­
sion. When the enemy is the rest of the world: the transnational forces of capi­
talism, masons, intellectuals and lobbies, populism calls for the restoration of 
the nation and for exclusion of the impure elements, be they foreigners or 
simply “others”. Democracy tends to be identified with a system based on 
identity, and solely on identity. Where a populist movement claims that it rep­
resents a specific identity within a polity, “territory becomes the one adjustable 
variable, since society cannot overcome its biological or cultural diversity”.
Such politics of exclusion have many dimensions. One is illustrated by the 
Front National which has re-opened the black box of the past: the combination 
of authoritarian leadership with xenophobia, nationalism and cultural cleans­
ing. The Austrian or Flemish versions are close to this model. Another variant 
can be found, for instance, in Italy, where the Lega has succeeded in creating a 
fake territory which exists only in the minds of a few excited activists. A third 
dimension, much older in its origins and more stable in its expression, is 




























































































system, it is not as innocuous as it may seem. A recent study published in the 
American Journal of Political Science shows that state or local referenda put 
on the ballot at the citizens’ initiative may have a very negative impact on civil 
rights (Gamble, 1997). In her research, Barbara Gamble underlines the differ­
ential success rates of initiatives or popular referenda according to the subject 
matter in question. Only one-third of all initiatives and referenda were 
endorsed by the voters, yet three-quarters of those initiatives that would 
restrict civil rights were approved. In other words, those already in a minority 
position and affected by the rules of the representative system see their posi­
tion further weakened by the use of hostile initiatives. Constitutional democ­
racy is far from being perfect, but direct democracy also has many drawbacks 
and can produce many negative effects.
Conclusion
The tension between constitutionalism and populism is rooted in the fabric 
of our democracies. Because of the too numerous bad experiences we have 
gone through, we all know that pure democracy a la Rousseau is at best im­
possible and at worst, the recipe for dictatorship and totalitarianism. Yet we 
have probably gone too far in insulating the people from politics, except in 
rather conventional, ritualistic exercises such as elections. The populism which 
is once again appearing on the stage might be understood as a signal, as the call 
and need for major involvement of the civil society. Power can be confiscated 
by many different groups: parties, lobbies, bureaucrats, experts and markets. 
It is the role and function of democracy to strike the balance and to accommo­
date these various conflicting interests. Today, there is a disaffection with 
democratic values and practices and the feeling that politicians do not care 
about the real problems of the people and that the people’s voice is not heard 
by those who govern. The problem cannot be solved simply through some 
kind of institutional engineering, such as the injection of instruments of direct 
democracy into the representative system. While this may help, it is not suffi­
cient and could even produce negative consequences, as history has demon­
strated. Nor is the Madisonian view that voting is a method for controlling 
officials sufficient either, because the mechanisms put in place do no work 
properly or the issues at stake escape popular control. If we accept, along with 
William Riker, that “all the elements of the democratic method are means to 
render voting practically effective and politically significant”, then we should 
be attentive to the populist message (Riker, 1982). If the people believe that 




























































































But populism, by closing itself within a more or less imagined community 
conceived of as being “the people” cannot provide the answer. There is a need 
for a new civic culture which allows for multiple allegiances and involve­
ments, which combines the “right to roots” with the “right to options”, which 
links the village and the world. We still have everything to learn and do con­
cerning this new stage of democratic development. If we want to avoid resis­
tance to globalisation (which does have certain negative effects on present 
democratic systems) turning tribalism and exclusion into an attractive alterna­
tive, democracy has to face the needs of this fin de siècle. Over the past two 
centuries, representative democracy has shown a remarkable capacity for 
adjustment and adaptation to the evolving needs and pressures of society, even 
if this transformation has often been more reactive than proactive. Today, the 
new challenge of globalisation produces a two-fold dilemma: on the one hand, 
it means the westernisation of the world thanks to a mix of technology, trade, 
market and human rights ideology; on the other hand, globalisation challenges 
the very foundations of the Western polities.
In this phase of world transformation, concepts and ideas, such as nation, 
state, citizen, the people, democracy are again and again discussed, re-elabo- 
rated and manipulated. Europe, in particular, is torn between its old national 
heritage, its variety of cultures, languages and political history, on the one 
hand, and its aspirations to construct a new polity which can be respectful of 
differences while also solving common problems in accordance with demo­
cratic principles. We should not aspire to the prevalent division in the U.S., 
where constitutionalism and Madisonian democracy prevail at the federal 
level, while populism often dominates at the State or local level. But the rise 
and development of populist claims in Europe should warn us that the so- 
called democratic deficit of the Union implies adjustment and change at the 
national level as well. Precisely because the nature of the problems democracy 
has to face are less state-based than ever, it would be foolish to maintain 
unchallenged the identification of democracy with a territory, a nation and its 
people. Let’s not forget that when the French Revolution invoked the French 
people, it drew from the Normans and the Britons, the Provincials as well as 
the Basques, or, to put it in sociological terms used by Eugene Weber, it made 
peasants into Frenchmen (Weber, 1979).
For the time being, there is no such thing as an European people, but only a 
union of various peoples. Without hiding the immense difficulty inherent in 
making “a people of peoples”, it seems to me that this is the only alternative 
we have to a world of tribes unified simply by a common market. The 




























































































view, goes in the wrong direction. By identifying the Demos with the heavy 
identity of the Volk, this decision not only impedes the necessary démocratisa­
tion - in the full sense of the word - of the European Union, but also provides 
indirect support for the populist view that only the people of the nation can 
form the basis of a true democratic polity. Once again, like the democratic 
pioneers of the nineteenth century, we have to invent and build slowly and 
incrementally, through experimentation and learning, a democracy which is 
adapted to our time. Once again, the task is to reconcile popular will and gou­
vernement modéré, a sense of belonging and constitutional patriotism, legiti­
macy and efficiency, the rights of man and the rights of the people.
Let me give the last word to Montesquieu who was not a democrat but made 
an immense contribution to the foundation of pluralistic democracy:
Je suis homme avant d’être français parce que je suis nécessairement homme et que je 
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